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Finland possesses one of the most highly oligopolistic grocery store markets in the world 
with only two chains having more than 80 % of the whole market share. Against all odds, 
the German chain Lidl managed to penetrate the market in 2002 and during 15 years, 
expand their market share to around 10%.  
 
The purpose of this bachelor’s thesis was to examine what Finland is like as a target of 
expansion, how consumers are expected to behave, and how the competition is likely to 
react if another foreign grocery store chain would enter Finland, using Lidl as an example.  
 
The thesis can be used for retailers as well as other segments as it includes a general 
overview of the Finnish grocery trade markets and what kind of reactions a new entrant 
can expect. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this bachelor's thesis was to investigate the current grocery store markets 
in Finland and if it would be profitable for a foreign grocery store chain to expand to 
Finland. Lidl’s market entry was used as an example and what can be learned from their 
endeavour was analysed. The aim was to gain an outlook of the current situation in Fin-
land, understand the customer behaviour in grocery market and competition behaviour in 
case of a new entrant. The current policies of the competition as of 2017 were reviewed 
to find out how a foreign company would gain the maximum advantage if they tried to 
penetrate the market. 
 
To fully understand the competition, there was first a need to look into the current situa-
tion of the Finnish grocery store market, which has been drastically changing since the 
recession in the 1990’s. Finland is a vast but sparsely populated country with only 5.5 
million people. This brought with it major logistical issues as well as issues of the cost-
efficiency.  
 
In short, an average Finnish person is most likely to do her/his shopping in stores owned 
by S Group, Kesko or Lidl, which together have almost 90% of the market share of which 
less than 10% is assigned for Lidl. Other monopolies and existing infrastructures further 
hurt Lidl’s aims to gain more market share, for example not until 2015 the Finnish mo-
nopoly for strong alcoholic beverages Alko started to move more stores to the same busi-
ness space with Lidl. (Rantala 2015) 
 
What makes the Finnish situation a little different from a two profit-maximizing duopoly, 
is that S Group is a cooperative and instead of shareholders, has close to two million 
member-owners. Kesko is a profit-maximizing firm listed on the Helsinki stock ex-
change. These two create a mixed duopoly which has not been extensively researched.  
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2 FINLAND AS A TARGET OF EXPANSION 
 
Finland is a sovereign state with a free market economy located in Northern Europe. Fin-
land declared its independence in 1917 with a history of being part of Sweden and Russia 
before that. Having been a part of Sweden, Finland has a Swedish speaking minority of 
5,3 % of the total 5,5 million people population. 88,3 % of the population speaks Finnish. 
Despite being the eighth largest country in Europe, it is not densely populated. More than 
1,4 million people live in the southern part of Finland, the Greater Helsinki metropolitan 
area. (Statistics Finland 2017) 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Population density in Finland, inhabitants per square kilometre in 2010 
(Räisänen 2017) 
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TABLE 1. Information about Finland. (Statistics Finland 2017) 
 
 
 
2.1 PEST-analysis 
 
PEST-analysis can be conducted in order to create an understanding of the country’s 
macro-economic situation through its current political, economic, social and technologi-
cal state. These factors have an effect on the processes a business should take into account 
when looking into expanding to a new country. (Newton 2014.) 
 
2.1.1 Political 
 
Finland joined the EU in 1995 and the currency was changed to euro in 1999. The civil 
law system is adopted and slightly altered from the Swedish model. Worth noting is that 
the president may request the Supreme Court to review laws.  The Finnish economy is 
largely driven by technological innovations thanks to the Finnish advancements in many 
technological areas, including software, hardware and networks. The markets are boosted 
by efficiency in legal and regulatory aspects allowing innovation. The political and gov-
ernmental situation is reliably stable due to the lowest corruption levels in the world and 
Finland is also one of the top countries when it comes to business freedom and property 
Name Republic of Finland 
Capital Helsinki 
Population 5,503,000 (December 2016 est.) 
Total area 338,145 sq. km 
Urbanization 85 % of population (2010) 
Official Languages Finnish 91,2 %, Swedish 5,5 % 
Major religion Lutheran Church 72,0 %, Orthodox 1,1 %, other Chris-
tian 1,6 %, none or unknown 25,3 % 
Life expectancy Men 78 years, Women 83 years 
Monetary unit Euro (EUR) 
Main exports Machinery, electronics, chemicals, paper and paper prod-
ucts 
Unemployment rate 8 % (September 2017 est.) 
Inflation rate 0,8 % (September 2017 est.) 
GDP per capita USD 43 090 (2016 est.) 
GDP real growth rate 1,4 % (2016 est.) 
External debt USD 544.7 billion (31 March 2016 est.) 
Labour force (15-74 yrs.) 2,448 million (2016 est.) 
Exports EUR 51,878 billion (2016) 
Imports EUR 55,003 billion (2016) 
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rights (Transparency International 2017). The biggest political parties in Finland, the 
Center Party of Finland (Keskusta), Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), National 
Coalition Party (Kokoomus) and the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), all share the same 
goal which is trying to get Finland to pioneer creativity and competence. 
 
In corporate taxation, the Finnish companies are taxed according to their global income 
whereas non-resident companies are not. Non-resident companies are taxed on income 
sourced in Finland. The tax rate on the corporate income tax is 20 % and was reduced 
from its original 24,5 % in the beginning of 2014. Overall, Finland has high level of tax-
ation. 30,5 % for the income tax rate and 24 % for the standard VAT, some products and 
services are taxed differently. (Verohallinto 2017.) 
 
2.1.2 Economic 
 
As Finland is an EU country and the currency used is euro, the inflation risk is not high 
due to the stability of the euro. However, the stability might be influenced by events in 
the Euro-zone, one of the examples being the UK leaving the European Union. The final 
form of ‘Brexit’ and the influence it will have is yet to be seen, as of November 2017. 
Foreigners investing in Finland find the trade freedom obtainable and attractive, but also 
see the costs of labour being high, especially compared to many Asian countries. For 
many SMEs, transferring the production to Finland is not desirable. It should be remem-
bered though, that high costs in labour directly influence the buying power of the Finnish 
consumers thus creating a good platform for technology firms and premium products. It 
should be noted that some industries might need licensing.  
 
In grocery retail, Finland has had a revitalizing decade since the 2008 recession, which 
turned budget surpluses into deficits due to difficulties in government finances and the 
debt ratio. The sales volume in grocery trade increases slowly, but the number of stores 
has been on a down trend. (Finnish Grocery Trade Association 2016.) 
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TABLE 2. Household expenditures in Finland. (Statistics Finland 2017) 
 
 
The amount spent in groceries and non-alcoholic drinks was in decline during the depres-
sion in the 90’s but has found support in 12% of the total expenditure. One reason to the 
slow rise has been competition and taxation adjustments in the sector, but the stability is 
compensated by rising living costs partly because urbanization.  
 
2.1.3 Social 
 
TABLE 3. The population structure of Finland (Statistics Finland 2017) 
 
 Year 
Population Unit 1900 1950 1990 2000 2010 2016 
Total 1 000 2 656 4 030 4 998 5 181 5 375 5 503 
Men 1 000 1 311 1 926 2 426 2 529 2 638 2 712 
Women 1 000 1 345 2 104 2 572 2 652 2 737 2 791 
Age          
 0–14 % 35,0 30,0 19,3 18,1 16,5 16,2 
15–64 % 59,6 63,3 67,2 66,9 66,0 62,9 
65-  % 5,4 6,7 13,5 15,0 17,5 20,9 
Language          
Finnish % 86,8 91,1 93,5 92,4 90,4 88,3 
Swedish % 12,9 8,6 5,9 5,6 5,4 5,3 
Sami % 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Russian % 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,5 1,0 1,4 
Other % 0,0 0,1 0,4 1,4 3,2 5,1 
 
Out of the around 5.5 million people over 20 % live around the capital Helsinki as seen 
in figure 1 and the moving trend is towards major cities which results in a high urbaniza-
 % 
Household expenditures 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Living costs and energy 18,6 18,2 24,6 26,2 28,2 
Groceries and non-alcoholic drinks 21,3 16,3 12,6 12,1 12,4 
Transportation 14,4 14,5 13,3 12,3 11,8 
Culture and free time 10,2 11,2 11,3 11,8 10,5 
Hotels, cafes and restaurants 6,4 7,7 6,4 6,3 6,3 
Home appliances 6,1 5,4 4,9 5,3 5,0 
Health 2,1 2,9 3,8 4,4 4,6 
Alcohol and cigarettes 6,3 6,6 5,8 5,0 4,5 
Clothing and shoes 6,1 5,6 4,6 4,7 4,3 
Telecommunications 1,1 1,4 3,1 2,5 2,3 
Education 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,4 0,4 
Other goods and services 7,2 9,8 9,2 8,9 9,7 
Total expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 
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tion rate (table 1). Thanks to the health care system, low birth rate and high living stand-
ards, Finland is looking at an aging population. This will in turn mean that Finland will 
be fighting against a work force gap during the coming decades and projections by Sta-
tistics Finland state that over a quarter of the population will be over the current retirement 
age by 2030. (Statistics Finland 2017.) 
 
Finland is widely known for its education standards. Among the countries included in 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD for short, Fin-
land was the highest ranked country with 84% of the 25-64-year-old population having 
at least upper-secondary education with the OECD average being 75% (OECD 2014). 
Highly educated population also creates a shortage in workforce in lower lever occupa-
tions such as plumbers and construction workers. High education also brings good lan-
guage skills. Every Finn learns at least two other languages than Finnish, these being 
English and Swedish, and often students will pick a third one as optional studies.  This 
prepares the Finnish workforce to be ready for the globalizing work environment.  
 
2.1.4 Technological 
 
The Finnish government highlights the importance of investments in the research and 
development sector, but during the last few years, Finland has been cutting from the sec-
tor. Even with the cuts, the state aims to back innovation and businesses by supporting 
and sponsoring networking events and start-up accelerators. Overall, the GDP share allo-
cated for R&D during 2015 was 2,9% whereas in 2009 the share was 3,8% of the total 
GDP. (Statistics Finland 2016.) 
 
Despite the labour costs, Finland is highly industrialized and technologically advanced in 
manufacturing even though it is dependent on importing raw materials. The technology 
industry itself is currently the most important exporting industry. (Technology Industries 
2017.) Finland is widely connected with current technology. According to a study con-
ducted by Statistics Finland, 88% of the population used the Internet in 2016 with 72% 
going online in some way multiple times a day with the percentage going up to 96% for 
those under 45 years old. The Finns go online to do everything from banking to looking 
up information and media consumption. This creates a perfect turf for technology com-
panies to create and test their products. (Statistics Finland 2016.) 
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2.2 Grocery store business in Finland 
 
The grocery store segment in Finland is controlled by two groups, S Group and Kesko. 
These syndicates have a 83 % combined market share and Lidl is currently at the third 
place with its 10 % market share. (Finnish Grocery Trade Association 2017.) S Group 
and Kesko both have store sizes ranging from small markets to supermarkets while Lidl 
only has medium sized stores. This being said, Lidl has been looking into upscaling their 
store sizes in Finland, though the larger stores are still smaller than the most of the com-
petitors’ stores (IGD Retail Analysis 2015). Other private grocery stores include Suomen 
Lähikauppa Oy 1,5 %, Tokmanni-concern 1,7 %, Stockmann 1,0 %, M-chain 0,6 %,   
Minimani 0,6 % and other private stores 1,9 %.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Market shares of the Finnish grocery store markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S-Group
47 %
K-Group
36 %
Lidl 
Finland 
Ky
10 %
Other 
private
7 %
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2.2.1 S Group 
 
With its 47% market share, the S Group is without a doubt the biggest grocery trade chain 
in Finland. It has operation all through Finland and has spread around the Baltic region 
and Russia. The structure of the S Group spreads to supermarkets, department and spe-
cialty stores, restaurants, travel industry, agriculture, petrol and products (table 4). It also 
has its own bank, the S Bank, which is available to its co-op members. There are 20 
regional cooperatives, which are independent. They, with SOK Corporation, are owned 
by the co-op members (SOK 2017). Anyone can be a co-op member and out of the 5,5 
million people in Finland, 2,2 million people are member owners of the S Group. Being 
a member allows the customer up to 5% purchase reward in money, depending on how 
active the customer is with preferring the S Groups’ services. The customers can also 
receive payment-method bonus if they use the group’s own S Bank card to pay. During 
2016, S Group paid 353 million euros in bonuses back to its co-op members. It is also 
among the biggest employers in Finland with almost 38 thousand employees. Retail sales 
totalled 11 billion euros in 2016. (SOK 2017.) 
 
TABLE 4. S Group’s retail sales by business area in 2016 (SOK 2017) 
 
S Group's retail excluding taxes 
Business area Million EUR 
Prisma 3 451 
S-market 3 322 
Sale and Alepa 978 
Other supermarket trade 5 
Supermarket trade total 7 755 
Hardware trade 197 
Service station store and fuel sales 1 543 
Department store and specialty store trade 300 
Travel industry and hospitality business 793 
Automotive trade and accessories 339 
Agricultural trade 76 
Other 15 
S Group total 11 020 
 
In total, the S Group owns supermarket trade through five different chains, in over 900 
locations which also creates an extensive logistics network. Department and speciality 
store trade is conducted through in more than 70 locations. There are also 25 renovation, 
decoration and building related hardware stores. Almost 440 fuel stations keep the Finn-
ish cars on the road and lastly the travel industry and hospitality business side of the S 
Group offers more than 60 hotels and over 750 restaurants. (SOK 2017.) Having extended 
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its market to other places aside from just groceries and having its roots all the way to 
banking, the S Group is a conglomerate hard to beat. The S Group also has its own product 
lines called Rainbow, Kotimaista and X-tra.  
 
2.2.2 K-Group 
 
K-Group consists of Kesko and K-retailers. K-Group has the second largest market share 
of grocery store segment with 36 %. Altogether, it has close to 2000 stores in Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus and Poland. Multinational 
operations brought in 13,2 billion euros (VAT 0%) in total retail sales during 2016, with 
a total of around 45 000 employees. Unlike the S Group, Kesko is listed on Nasdaq Hel-
sinki.  
 
TABLE 5. K-Groups retail sales by business area in 2016 (Kesko 2017) 
 
K-Group's retail excluding taxes 
Business area Million EUR 
K-Citymarket 2078 
K-Supermarket 1764 
K-Market 1208 
Other supermarket trade 728 
Supermarket trade total* 5778 
Hardware trade** 2901 
Service station store and fuel sales 112 
Department store and specialty store trade 468 
Automotive trade and accessories 868 
Agricultural trade 568 
Other 2505 
K-Group total 13200 
  
* Not including K-Market Russia and 
Kespro  
** Including other Nordic countries  
 
 
In 2016 Kesko acquired Suomen Lähikauppa’s stores to expand its reach on smaller store 
sizes. The acquisition was completed with a condition by FCAA (Finnish Competition 
and Consumer Authority) that stated that at least 60 of Kesko’s stores must be sold to 
competitors. As of 2017, all of Suomen Lähikauppa’s Siwa and Valintatalo stores are 
working under Kesko’s K-Market name. Kesko significantly improved especially its foot-
hold in city areas and smaller rural towns which do not usually have larger stores nearby. 
(Kesko 2017.) 
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Just like the S Group, Kesko also has its own customer loyalty programme, but it is not 
ownership related. It has 3,8 million people or 2,2 million households included in its bo-
nus system. Like in S Group’s alternative, the bonuses are paid back in money and being 
a member gives the customer access to discounts in the partner companies. Kesko is also 
in partnership with one of the biggest banks in Finland called OP which has allowed its 
bonus card to be integrated to the bank’s own cards eliminating the need for two separate 
cards. The K-Group also has its own product line called Pirkka. 
As can be seen, from the customer point of view, it makes sense to own both membership 
cards since they are most of the time the only ones the customers need when shopping 
groceries in Finland. The smaller grocery store chains have tried and failed as it seems 
like the bonus card system would become overly saturated in the minds of the Finnish 
consumers if more companies try to enter that business model.  
 
2.2.3 Lidl 
Lidl is a more multinational company differentiating from its competition in Finland as it 
has stores across Europe and even in the United States. In this section, the author concen-
trates on Lidl Finland Ky’s actions and current state leaving out the multinational aspect 
of business. This is to gain understanding of the current competition if a new company 
was to set foot in Finland.  
Unlike the competition, Lidl focuses only on the grocery side of the market. Through 
Finland, Lidl has over 160 stores including smaller towns in which larger Prisma or K-
Citymarket stores do not see enough customers. All combined, Lidl has around 5200 em-
ployees and has a very polished system of career opportunities, including work abroad. 
Lidl Finland Ky is an independent subsidiary of the Lidl concern. It opened its first 10 
stores in 2002 with one distribution centre in Janakkala and employed a total of 380 em-
ployees. Nowadays there is another distribution centre in Laukaa and a third is being 
planned for 2018. As with the competition, a fluently working logistics network is im-
portant because of the shape of Finland. (Lidl 2017.)  
From the very beginning, Lidl’s goal was to endure the competition in food pricing. Its 
policy includes universal pricing throughout the country, which is different from the com-
petition. The cheapest prices can be found in Lidl’s own product lines which include 
Dulano, FreeWay, Kania, Kartanon, Milbona, Vitafit and Solevita. One of the most pop-
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ular seasonal lines is Grillimaisteri, which offers affordable BBQ-products during sum-
mertime. Most of the products offered are originally from Germany but as pressure grew 
to offer also domestic products, Lidl now offers also Finnish food produce. The advertis-
ing is shown in media, free newspapers that are distributed to homes around the area and 
other advertisements that usually mention the quality/price ratio. Unlike its competition, 
Lidl does not provide any kind of bonus system. Store sizes vary from 400 m2 to 2500 m2 
and are mostly located to be easily accessed with a personal vehicle making it rare to find 
a store in the city centre.  
 
TABLE 6. Lidl information (Asiakastieto 2017) 
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Turnover (Million EUR) 959 1191 1358 1405 1449 
Profit (Million EUR) 56  79  78  70  68  
Staff 3 554 4 236 4 659 4 900 4 884 
Equity ratio 38,40 % 45,30 % 43,80 % 42,00 % 40,30 % 
 
2.2.4 Others 
 
Together S Group, K Group and Lidl make up over 90 % of the market share in Finland. 
The rest include Suomen Lähikauppa Oy 1,5 %, Tokmanni-concern 1,7 %, Stockmann 
1,0 %, M-chain 0,6 %, Minimani 0,6 % and other private stores 1,9 %. Suomen Lähi-
kauppa Oy’s market share dropped from almost 7% in Kesko’s acquisition of the Siwa 
and Valintatalo stores. (Finnish Grocery Store Association 2017.) 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Market entry modes 
 
The degree of the concentration in the grocery trade segment in Finland is high. Three of 
the biggest chains cover over 90% of the market. Lidl paved way to show that an entry of 
a foreign competition was possible, this was not thought as a real threat before that. A lot 
of research has been made about a new company’s entrance to a market. Kuester et al. 
(1999) suggest that the more concentrated a market is, the less competitive it is, but with 
only few competitors the moves are followed closely (Schumpeter 2013) and companies 
not willing to give up their position are usually the most aggressive to compete. The cor-
rect selection of the strategic entry mode is very important. In case of a new competition, 
the concentration decreases causing then the competitiveness to rise (Shankar 1999). 
 
Gatignon et al. (1989) found that in oligopolistic markets, the reactions can be predicted 
by following the elasticity of the marketing mix instruments used by the competition. 
Gatignon et al. (1997) also states that using several marketing mix instruments are usually 
not as effective as using the most elastic instrument i.e. the price.  
 
The entry to a new market can be divided into four stages as Porter (1980) has differenti-
ated. In the first stage, the entrant familiarises itself with the new market. In the second, 
it enters the market and aims to build an initial position. Third stage is for implementing 
a long-term strategy and permanent settlement. The fourth and final stage is for expand-
ing, maintaining and defending the position. (Porter 1980.) 
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FIGURE 3. Entry modes (modified from Albaum & Duerr 2008, 305-391; Hollensen 
2004, 291-350) 
 
Figure 3 shows the different entry modes that a company can follow when entering a new 
market. Through export entry modes, firms have the highest flexibility and lowest risks 
but also sacrifice a lot of control. The export entry modes can be divided into direct ex-
port, cooperative export modes and indirect export. Non-export entry modes include in-
termediate entry, which covers licensing, franchising, joint ventures, strategic alliances 
and contract manufacturing, and hierarchical modes. If a company decides to follow in-
termediate modes the decision making and risks are often split. The least flexibility and 
highest risk is in hierarchical modes but these also bring the highest amount of control 
over the business.  
 
As a company moves its business to a new location, it is essential to choose an entry 
mode. All aspects of the business, from human to financial capital, need to be carefully 
planned, especially when the target market is in a different country. Each of the entry 
modes have its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Risks and control increase -  Lower flexibility 
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3.1.1 Export entry modes 
 
Hollensen (2004, 291) wrote that export entry mode is when the companies have manu-
facturing in another country than the country of expansion, whether the company´s home 
country or a third country was chosen to do manufacturing in. Export entry mode is a 
good option when experience in international expansion is lacking as it keeps risks low 
and costs less than many other options. The exporting company will, however, needs to 
give up control. As figure 3 shows, export entry modes can be divided into direct, indirect 
and cooperative export modes.  
 
In direct export mode, the company is in contact and sells directly to foreign companies 
which import or buy the products into their country. The logistics can be done through a 
third party. In this scenario, the exporting company has full control on who it is selling 
its products to. If the buyers aim to distribute the products in their country, they are in 
control of their process of selling. The indirect export mode means that the company aim-
ing to export its products finds another domestic company with capital and experience to 
do it for them. The company itself will have no control over what happens in the new 
market and therefore can collect very little data. This method is cheap and a good way to 
test the markets. Indirect exporting therefore differs from direct exporting in what point 
of the process the control moves to the company in the target country. (Hollensen 2004, 
298-301.) 
 
Cooperative export mode brings the two or more companies together to work on a com-
mon goal. The company’s share capital and other resources to create larger collaboration 
to reach new a market, which neither of the firms could do by themselves. R&D in the 
target market can be done in collaboration, and the risk of the venture is shared. In coop-
erative export, it is important to have a common goal and a long-term plan. The risk of 
the cooperation is in jeopardy if the relationship between the companies is disrupted. 
(Hollensen 2004, 303.) To sum up export entry modes, it is doing business internationally 
through not only through agents and distributors, but also directly with the end customer 
while keeping the business in domestic market. 
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3.1.2 Intermediate entry modes 
 
Licensing, franchising, joint ventures, strategic alliances and contract manufacturing all 
belong under the intermediate entry modes. They create a medium though which compa-
nies and cooperation companies share their risks while still keeping better control versus 
the exporting option. Flexibility is compromised through longer lasting contract and the 
companies risk the other party potentially becoming a rival.  
 
In licensing, the company grants access to use some part of the business, like technology, 
expertise, label, classified information or a single product to another company or an indi-
vidual. A contract is created for the licensee to pay the licensor through different kind of 
options, to mention initial payments, yearly minimums or percentages as examples among 
other options. In licensing, the biggest risk is carried by the licensee but licensing also 
opens doors for it becoming a rival to the original licensor, since information needs to be 
passed in the process. Therefore, a comprehensive contract needs to be created to keep 
the company buying the license controllable. The contract times are usually longer. This 
gives to the company looking for expansion a rather low-risk entry tactic though the prof-
its may stay moderate. (Albaum & Duerr 2008.) 
 
Franchising covers a lot wider amount of information and resources given to the fran-
chisee. If, for example an entrepreneur in Finland would like to establish a new Subway 
restaurant, he/she would have to try to convince Subway to make a franchising deal with 
her/him, which would allow the franchisee to buy into the Subways system and allow the 
use of their designs, patents, suppliers etc. to make it part of Subway’s chain of restau-
rants. Using the practices given by the franchisor, the franchisee would open the restau-
rant and have a limited control over it. For the franchisor, in this example Subway, it 
might be challenging to oversee the quality of the service or product. (Hollensen 2004.) 
 
Joint venture is a cooperation between two companies, often from different countries, 
that bring a product or a service to a new market. In an international joint venture, the 
other partner is often from the country of expansion and therefore has the knowledge of 
the culture and market. The companies often share a percentage of the ownership or as-
sets, but this is not necessary. A joint venture reduces the risk of entering an unknown 
market, but also introduces losing control in some level and as always, the partnership 
might suffer from difficulties in cultural differences or from some other conflicts. (Al-
baum & Duerr 2008.) 
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Contract manufacturing places the process of manufacturing a product often close to 
the end user. While it brings risks of the contracted company to learn the product or carry 
out subpar products, it also saves money in logistics. Most of the control stays with the 
original company. One of the most famous contract manufacturer is Samsung manufac-
turing the displays of Apple products. (Bach 2017.) Contracts in manufacturing can be 
short, for example just one product line or a part of a product. Dividing the process to 
different manufactures reduces the risk of a single production facility to get too much 
information on the end product but might introduce other risks. Trust between the parent 
company and the manufacturer is crucial.  
 
Strategic alliance differs from the joint venture in terms of capital and other resources 
shared with other companies. In a strategic alliance, there may be multiple companies and 
as an example Hollensen (2004, 318) mentions the famous McDonald´s, Disney and 
Coca-Cola alliances. The companies stay independent but aim towards a mutual benefit 
by sharing resources. The contracts can be short or long term depending on the goal, but 
more risks are involved the longer the cooperation is, and companies might risk coming 
dependent on the other companies.  
 
3.1.3 Hierarchical entry modes 
 
Hierarchical entry modes pose the most risks and capital needs for the company planning 
expansion outside its home country but they also give the most control. Hierarchical entry 
modes include expatriates, subsidiaries, acquisitions and Greenfield investment strate-
gies. (Hollensen 2004.) 
 
Expatriates are people who get sent from their home country to another country in order 
to kick start, supervise and lead the new company branch. This way not as much infor-
mation needs to be passed to other parties since some level of management comes from 
inside the company. Expatriate work is very demanding and can easily become costly 
since sending representatives abroad might include also their families and covering the 
costs of living to the same standard as in home country. Justifying the costs is often hard 
and there is no guarantee how efficiently the expatriates can handle their personal life and 
how they will get adjusted to the culture. 
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If a company creates a subsidiary in another country, it is usually because of a local de-
mand or better access to a resource, tangible or intangible. The product created or the 
service offered does not necessarily need to be the same as the parent company offers. 
The reasons to create subsidiaries can include further tax or risk control for example. 
Subsidiaries are often owned by the parent company with more than 50% of the owner-
ship whereas in a wholly owned subsidiary, the parent company owns 100% of the sub-
sidiary. (Hollensen 2004.) 
To fully transfer the operations to another country and start from ground up, a company 
can choose a Green Field investment, which means moving to a different country and 
starting from the beginning. Possible factories need to be built and market research 
needs to be conducted before starting to operate, so the time and capital investments can 
get high. Brown field investment on the opposite would mean leasing the infrastructure 
for example instead of building from the beginning. Green field is a risky and a long-
term investment but keeps the control fully in the company’s hands.  
Acquisitions happen when a company buys over 50% of another company gaining the 
deciding number of shares. This often happens so that the personnel, brand and other as-
sets stay as they were. It is a quick way to enter the market and expand the company but 
can also lead to conflicts with original management or staff, if new business models are 
introduced. Acquisitions can be used to reduce costs, for example a phone company ac-
quiring a manufacturing plant and therefore eliminating the costs of doing it via con-
tract. Backward integration means acquiring companies towards the supplier whereas 
forward integration is moving towards the end user, together the integrations are called 
vertical mergers. (Hollensen 2004.) 
 
3.2 Choosing the location 
 
In a sparsely populated country like Finland, the location of the stores plays a significant 
role. Location selection is a strategic decision which has to be carefully planned as it can 
be the determining factor on whether the store will succeed or not. (Weitz 2004.) To an-
alyse the attractiveness and suitability of a retail business location, the following factors 
should be taken into account when planning the location: 
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FIGURE 4. Factors affecting the site selection. (Weitz 2004, 242-248, modified) 
 
 
3.2.1 Competition 
 
The competitive environment in the selected area of entry or expansion has a major in-
fluence on how the business will succeed as it has a straight correlation on the demand. 
Weitz (2004, 242-248) defines three different scenarios that can be used to describe the 
competitiveness of an area. The area might be well balanced, in which case the area has 
the demand by the customers which is then fulfilled by companies and their supply. In an 
under stored area, the demand exceeds the provided supply. These areas generally have 
the most potential for profits and are a quick route to gain market share in the area. Lastly, 
the area can be overstored. In this scenario, there are too many stores providing the same 
product or service and the customers are divided between them. Competition for custom-
ers in these areas is more intense and many entrants will fail. Entering will be easier if the 
product or service has a clear advantage over the competition.  
 
 
3.2.2 Accessibility of the location 
 
Location accessibility can be analysed by macro and micro analysis. In macro analysis, 
the company needs to review the factors that affect the location but cannot be influenced 
Location selection  
for a grocery store  
Competition 
Business climate 
Accessibility of 
the location 
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by the company. For example, roads and other artificial barriers might steer the customer 
to a different location. Supermarkets are usually located outside the centres since for ex-
ample parking spaces need to be provided. Natural barriers like land shapes and water 
areas affect the reachability as well. The micro analysis is about factors that have a direct 
influence on the success and can be affected. For example, higher level of visibility is not 
required in the case of bigger grocery stores since the people usually choose to go there 
for their weekly shopping, rarely it is an impulse shopping. Therefore, the stores can also 
be located away from the bigger store hubs in city centres for example. Parking also af-
fects the decision on where to go shopping. If parking is too far away and/or the parking 
places are too full, the customer is likely to look for something different.  
 
3.2.3 Business climate 
 
The business climate should be diversified enough to allow room for a new entrant. If the 
location is for example very seasonal, it will cause fluctuation to the cash flow and the 
number of customers visiting. The Finnish Lapland is a prime example since there is a 
significant increase in customer numbers during winter time and winter holidays whereas 
the other seasons do not provide nearly as much attraction to domestic or international 
tourists. The unemployment percentage also directly affects the purchasing power of a 
region and it also affects the economic growth of the region. 
 
3.2.4 Demographic and lifestyle characteristics of customers  
 
The last factor influencing the location of the business to be set up is the lifestyle charac-
teristics in the area. Growing area both economically and population-wise is the optimal 
choice. The income level and structure of families around the area affect the shopping 
habits alongside with the age of the population and level of education. It is worth remem-
bering that the same products do not necessarily interest the university students as the 
lower level employees even when the income would be comparable. 
 
3.3 Consumer behaviour 
 
A lot of research has been conducted on consumers and their buying behaviour. One of 
the biggest aspects affecting this behaviour is price (Han et al. 2001). Slightly contradict-
ing and adding study states that customers tend to look for the best value for their money 
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(Dickinson and Cooper 1992). This is emphasized in countries with high standard of liv-
ing, such as Finland. People expect to get value for their money, even if the product is 
cheap. 
 
The Finnish consumer behaviour can be compared to the other Northern Countries. San-
tander (2016) made a consumer profile of the Finnish population and how Finns behave 
as consumers. A lot of emphasis is put on the origin of the product and environmental 
aspects. This goes in line with what Ghalwash (2008, 71–87) found stating: “- using esti-
mates of the willingness to pay for environmental goods for different European countries 
(Finland, France, Norway, Holland, Spain and Sweden), found that the hypothesis that 
environmental goods are necessary goods cannot be rejected in most cases - “. Conven-
ience is also a growing factor especially in the food sector. High quality and healthy 
ready-cooked meals are trending. Finland is well-educated and the Finns can be expected 
to be aware of the origins and the quality of the product. (Santander 2016.) 
 
Price knowledge 
 
Price knowledge is being well kept up by the media and “food basket prices” are widely 
covered. The food basket contains the most common items bought in grocery stores. A 
better understanding of the food baskets’ importance in price perception is explained in 
chapter 4.3. The most accurate price knowledge can be expected to be from the most 
frequently bought items and retailers should take this into account when designing their 
marketing mix (Aalto‐Setälä and Raijas 2003) and be aware of the target market’s level 
of price consciousness. Another study by Dickson and Sawyer (1990, 48) suggests that 
“The more frequent buyers of the product category did not undertake more price checking 
and were not more accurate in their price knowledge”. Combining the studies, we can 
expect that more frequent buyers are accustomed to buying a certain product in an expec-
tation that it holds the value they have initially found. Food basket products can thus be 
used as a marketing method as well. Since the products included in the food basket often 
stay the same, stores are able to influence the overall price image of themselves by low-
ering the prices of the most commonly used food basket products and when the results 
are annually released, the perception of the price level of the store sticks, even when the 
products outside the food basket items are more expensive.  
 
Advertising and promotions affect the level of price knowledge of the whole segment 
increasing it among the customers. Mela et al. (1997) found out that while loyal customers 
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were less sensitive to price fluctuation, their knowledge of competitors and sensitivity to 
price changes increased over time. This has been changing after the revolution of e-com-
merce. While still being true, the price knowledge of a specific product is now more easily 
accessible through devices connected to the internet. Especially deal hunting has in-
creased as it has been made easy by online catalogues and stores. The younger generations 
tend to be less loyal due to the increased knowledge. 
 
While advertising makes the customers more price conscious, McGoldrick (1987) states 
that in “leader line pricing” specific items are priced more aggressively to create an image 
of the price range of the whole store. For a customer, even one price of an item he/she 
has price knowledge of, might lead to an assumption of the store’s price levels. Everyday 
items should thus be priced more competitively especially in hypermarkets to get custom-
ers there, even though the price of the other items would be higher.  
 
3.4 Retailer behaviour 
 
Sudhir (2001) states something very noticeable in the Finnish grocery store market. Co-
operation and alike prices are easily achieved in a high density and stable environment 
and the toughest competition is around the most price-sensitive sectors. As stated before, 
the loyal customers are less prone to be receptive to price fluctuation, which leads to 
companies trying to compete for first-time buyers. How much does hypermarkets’ prac-
tice to mostly hire high school students to cashier jobs affect their future perception on 
where to buy groceries when they live on their own, should be researched more.  
 
Large stores are the norm in Finland and they are used both in cities and countryside. The 
high number of cars suggest that people can travel to the closest supermarket for grocery 
shopping also in the more scarcely inhabited areas. (Autoalan Tiedotuskeskus 2017.) On 
average, people go to the store three times a week, according to the Finnish Grocery Trade 
Association (2016). Alcohol policies are strict, which allows people to buy alcohol prod-
ucts from grocery stores only up to 4.7% of alcohol volume, which will be upscaled to 
5.5% after the amendment changes taking place in the beginning of 2018. Anything 
higher than that needs to be bought from the government owned stores called Alko, which 
on its own is among other government owned monopolies. These stores are often attached 
to places where most people of the area do their shopping, hence boosting the bigger 
stores even more, but as mentioned, Alko has started connecting its stores to the side of 
Lidl’s as well.  
25 
 
 
Both Kesko and S Group have solved the problem of geographical pricing (price differ-
entiation between locations), with different chains. For example, Kesko has three differ-
ent sizes of stores scaling from the largest K-Citymarket via K-Supermarket to K-Market 
respectively with prices scaling up the smaller the store gets, much like Tesco UK have 
their Extra, Metro and Express sizes (all in all six different types). However, as Uusitalo 
and Rökman (2007, 123) state: “Geographical price differentiation may be constrained 
by the fact that retailers have to consider the price image of the chain as a whole”. As of 
2016, Lidl has not made any plans to change their strategy regarding geographical pricing, 
though it has made some case specific price changes to compete with the local stores 
(Seppälä 2009). In 2016, Lidl opened its biggest store in Finland in Kuopio. This store is 
around 2500 square meters in size whereas the most common size for Lidl in Finland is 
around 1200 square meters.  
 
Retailers expect the majority of people to easily change their shopping habits including 
the store, if the prices are cut. If competitors lower their prices, the natural response to 
that is to lower their own prices as well, especially in a highly duopolistic setting such as 
of Finland. Price change decisions in a duopolistic setting are also very risky, because in 
rare occasions one can be sure about the response of the competitor (Dickson and Urbany 
1994). Rao et al. (2000) talk about price war when businesses enter a competition on 
prices. Company responses to avoiding a price war can include changing customers’ 
choices with advertising to a different brand for example thus avoiding lowering prices. 
If a price war happens, cuts should be made to the segments customers are the most price 
conscious of, giving an image of overall price cuts.  
 
Price war  
 
The Dutch grocery store market saw a similar type market entrance in the early 2000s 
when the then leading supermarket chain Albert Heijn faced pricing competition from 
strong discounters Aldi and Lidl. This resulted the shoppers to gradually shift from Albert 
Heijn to these chains being unable to justify the prices in AH. A few years after declining 
numbers, AH cut prices from over 1000 products during a time span of just a few weeks, 
accompanied by a large marketing campaign. Other major competitors responded quickly 
including major brands both national and private. This nationwide price war resulted in 
8,2 % drop in food prices across the Netherlands and inflation was the lowest in 15 years. 
This war also resulted in a loss of added value of around 900 million Euros in the grocery 
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industry and more than 30,000 employees in the grocery industry lost their jobs. The 
literature seems to be inconclusive on how the price wars affect the market. (van Heerde 
2008) Generally, price wars are believed to affect negatively the revenues, but other stud-
ies also show that the impact of a price war on a company depends on the existing price 
position and the role in the war. Empirical research on the topic is hard to find. A review 
by Heil and Helsen (2001, 96) concludes: “It is unclear, what the overall effects of price 
wars are. Price wars are often assumed to lead to losses for the firms involved in the 
battle… It is, therefore, important to research how price wars affect firms in the industry, 
whether these effects are uniformly distributed, and how such effects persist in the long 
run through lower reference prices”. 
 
What can be learned from the case of Albert Heijn? In the case of the Dutch grocery store 
price war, AH wanted to improve the price image of the stores and succeeded, therefore 
the price war appeared to be successful even though other stores had to lower their prices 
as well. Smaller amount of circulating money of course also affected the competition 
negatively. The competitors also did not get the same price image improvement as the 
pioneer of the price war. In Finland, the S Group started to cheapen their products, ac-
companied with a marketing campaign in 2015 (Jokinen 2015) and even came up with a 
new word for the price reductions (“halpuuttaminen”). Not defined as a price war, but it 
has slowed down the market share rise of Lidl.  
 
In a case of a totally new market entrant, a competitive entry opposes a trigger to start a 
price war. In some cases, this threat is too strong for the new entrants to handle and they 
back out. If the entry happens and the company starts to gain market share on the benefit 
of lower prices, the price war escalation follows a power shift paradigm explained by 
Organski (1968). His theory states that the market leader is likely to counterattack the 
entrant while it still has power. Most likely the weapon of choice will be price since it is 
immediate and measurable.  
 
 
3.5 Synthesis 
 
The way how competitors will react to a price change is considered when making decision 
about pricing. Retailers tend to look for other solutions when a price war seems possible. 
If competition changes their prices, retailers wait for a while to see the consumers’ re-
sponse and act accordingly. Geographical pricing is used in the form of different store 
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chains to keep market brands separated and the customers’ price perception more predict-
able. Price perception of the whole store can be manipulated by making certain “food-
basket products” more competitive. Consumer price knowledge should be considered. 
Loyal customers tend to withstand higher price changes, but customer loyalty is declining 
due to the more easily available price comparison channels.  
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4 CONCERNS IN ENTERING THE MARKET 
 
A secondary research was conducted on the consumer behaviour, retailer behaviour and 
the case of Lidl entering the Finnish market. Primary data about the competitive moves 
are a well-kept secret and interviews tend to be biased or are at major risk to be leaning 
towards the company represented. The best way to approach the case is to see what pri-
mary data could be attained and learn from the latest entrant to the market and what mat-
ters should be considered when planning the entrance. 
 
 
4.1 Case Lidl 
 
In order to gain some kind of an understanding, what could be expected if a foreign gro-
cery store chain entered the markets, the case of Lidl entering in 2002 can be studied, 
especially Porter’s (1980) first two stages. 
 
Lidl decided to enter with opening ten stores simultaneously and within a year, establish 
30 more stores. This required a lot of time to find locations, taking care of permissions 
and infrastructure, which on the other hand gave the competition a lot of time to react. 
Lidl stayed quiet about its strategies which can be considered as an aggressive policy. 
After the entry, the competition began their marketing strategies as a counteract. 
 
Some of the tactics used by the competition took years for Lidl to get rid of. One example 
being the questioning of the quality of the products and whether they were to Finnish 
standards, and stating that the local authorities gave “more slack” to the foreign competi-
tion. Another thing that was brought up was the origin of the products, which as men-
tioned earlier, is an important aspect for the Finnish consumers. This was also dropped 
quickly due to false accusations. Lidl used beer as a competitive instrument (leader line 
pricing), which also ended up with it being officially investigated, and with nothing illegal 
found. These affected Lidl’s reputation for a long time, even though none of the accused 
claims were found true. (Uusitalo & Rökman 2007) 
 
The loyalty programmes by both Kesko and S Group had been widely adopted by the 
population with many of the households having a membership of both. Lidl did not have 
a loyalty programme which might have given an impression of higher prices or lower 
29 
 
quality products. The Finnish giants relied a lot on their strategy of having a wider product 
selection ranging from clothes and tools to food products.  
 
Until Lidl’s entrance to the market it was not believed that the price of the products would 
have such a strong importance, and price-oriented shopping was indeed not as possible 
as after Lidl’s entrance. Kesko ended up announcing that they would make price cuts to 
some 1000 items, which happens also to be the amount of products Lidl offers on average. 
Of course, these cuts were advertised widely. The Finnish competitors started to heavily 
advertise their own product lines which were cheaper and more appealing pricewise.  
 
4.2 S Group’s collaborations 
 
Part of S Group’s success, is their ability to collect businesses to their larger Prisma stores. 
The companies operating within their spaces are most of the time required to be part of 
their member ownership programme. This means that if a customer has bought him/her-
self into the programme and is a member, the businesses within the premises are part of 
it as well. For example, Elisa, one of the largest phone operators in Finland, is part of this 
collaboration. This allows their customers to have discounts and accumulate their bonus 
account through S Group’s banking system.  
 
The S Group has also started to bring foreign companies to Finland through their fran-
chising system. In 2014, the S Group announced that they would bring Marks & Spencer 
to Finland and it would start to operate within their business spaces. In 2017, there are 
four stores opened in total, all within spaces owned by S Group. In May 2017, the S Group 
announced a new collaboration with the UK retail giant Tesco. Their aim was to bring the 
Tesco Finest and Tesco Free From lines to the Finnish consumers and have advertised it 
as a premium line for a lower price. Whether Tesco will start selling products from the S 
Group in their stores is yet to be announced as of November 2017.  
 
It might not make sense to Tesco try to enter the Finnish markets and risking a price war, 
now that they have been able to enter the market with their own products through S Group. 
It might be a viable option for them to just keep the products on the shelves of the S 
Group, but they are also building up brand knowledge through this endeavour. Brand 
knowledge might help them to enter the market later with their own stores.  
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4.3 Food basket 
 
To show regional pricing and the importance of pricing with the commonly bought prod-
ucts in action, primary data was collected in the form of a ‘UK food basket’, a common 
instrument in Finland for the consumers to follow the price of the food. The food basket 
gets reviewed by the Finnish media annually in order to compare the different prices in 
different stores. This makes public a lot of interesting data which can then be analysed 
and reviewed. When comparing the Finnish food basket to a foreign chain, it can be 
shown how pricing of the specific products can affect the perception of the price level of 
the whole store.  
 
The food basket contains: 
 
• Tomatoes - price/kg 
• Bananas - price/kg 
• Oatmeal - cheapest package/kg 
• Coffee - 500g 
• Minced meat - 400g 
• Flavoured yoghurt - 1 litre 
• Milk - 1 litre (skimmed) 
• Edam cheese - cheapest pack/kg (has the word ‘Edam’ clearly stated) 
• Margarine - 400g (fat percentage >60%) 
 
The UK food basket was compiled from Tesco Extra in Salford, UK to achieve a rough 
understanding of the price differences between Tesco and the main competitors from Fin-
land. The products were chosen to be as comparable to their Finnish counterparts as pos-
sible and price was adjusted due to different sizes of packages. VAT difference was taken 
into account and all the prices shown are with VAT being 0% to make the comparison 
easier. UK has zero rated VAT for all the items included in the food basket. The VAT in 
Finland for all food is 14%. No logistical expenses were considered. The euro price was 
converted to pounds at the rate of 0.84. The prices are not representative of the prices 
Tesco could have if they entered Finnish markets and are only rudimentary.  
 
Secondary data was collected from the annual research made by the Finnish Consumer 
Union (Kuluttajaliitto 2016). Kesko’s pricing is intended to have more discounts whereas 
S Group has implemented the bonus rewarding system. This might be one reason to their 
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slight price variations and why S Group seems to be continuously cheaper, as discounts 
are not taken into account in the price comparisons. This is also expected to affect the 
price knowledge of the customers as the media publications about food baskets might be 
biased towards S Group. (The Finnish Consumer Union 2016.) 
 
TABLE 7. The food basket prices between Finnish grocery stores and Tesco UK in GBP. 
 
 
Tesco Prisma Citymarket Lidl 
Tomatoes £1,99 £0,94 £1,02 £1,32 
Bananas £0,79 £0,92 £1,07 £0,95 
Oatmeal £2,25 £0,55 £0,72 £0,60 
Coffee £7,70 £2,39 £2,54 £2,39 
Minced meat £1,69 £2,01 £2,20 £2,00 
Yoghurt £2,00 £0,63 £0,73 £1,02 
Milk £0,75 £0,47 £0,46 £0,48 
Cheese £2,85 £2,65 £2,94 £2,64 
Margarine £0,60 £0,35 £0,36 £0,28 
Total £20,62 £10,91 £12,05 £11,69 
 
 
A straight comparison of the total food prices is misleading. A further analysis of the data 
explains the reason why Tesco seems to be almost double the price compared to the Finn-
ish ones. For example, coffee which is included in the Finnish food basket, is not as an 
everyday item in the UK as it is in Finland, where coffee is consumed multiple times 
more per capita at 1.7kg per capita in UK vs. 9.6kg per capita in Finland. (The Caffeine 
Informer 2016.) 
 
Another notable difference was in oatmeal. Oatmeal is among the most common Finnish 
breakfasts and is thus a common household product. This pricing closely follows the the-
ory that was stated in the literature review in which the most commonly bought items are 
32 
 
also under more pressure price-wise. If the price of especially these two items were ad-
justed, the difference in prices would not seem as vast anymore. The food basket as a tool 
is a little biased in this situation and against Tesco. It should be stated that the compari-
sons based on food basket should be made within a country and not between the countries. 
In this case, the food basket is used between countries to show the importance of loss 
leader pricing from the view of the consumer. 
 
4.4 Harmonized pricing 
 
As stated in a general review (Lidl invades Finland 2007: 9): “The supermarket retail 
sector was relatively simple in Finland before the entry of Lidl in 2002, with a few chain 
competitors and local independent competition”. Lidl swept in with their consistent pric-
ing across all locations just as the Finnish consumers were shocked about the transfer to 
Euro and how it unfavourably affected the prices. A three-year-study by Uusitalo and 
Rökman pointed out four things which favourably boosted Lidl’s entry to the market: 
 
• Competition 
• Location 
• Term 
• Variety 
 
The price of the goods was consistent during the whole study and across all stores, ex-
cluding some cases of seasonal products. The competition had varying prices depending 
on location and other factors, especially concerning their own brands. Buying S Group’s 
or Kesko’s own brands is rising and currently about 20% of the food basket bought from 
their stores. (Huotari and Nalbantoglu 2015.) 
 
Vilmunen (2005) studied the frequency of price changes in Finnish hypermarkets and 
found out that on average the prices change on fresh products every 1.5 months and on 
processed food every nine months. 
 
The review (Lidl invades Finland 2007: 10) concludes that harmonized pricing could “- 
give a lot of market power in a very short space of time to a new entrant, and it would be 
no surprise if such an effect applied to the successful expansion of UK retailer Tesco into 
markets such as Thailand and the Czech Republic.”  
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4.5 Online grocery shopping 
 
Shopping groceries online is a natural move for the industry to move next. It is already in 
use in the UK and Ireland by Tesco for example, but has only just started in Finland. In 
Tesco’s model, the customer buys the groceries through an online service, pays for them 
and then picks them up or chooses to have them delivered. The delivery costs for the 
customer can be as low as 7,5 € / month with a minimum order value of €50 with up to 
one order a day. (Tesco 2017.) 
 
In Finland, Kesko is offering a limited service of online shopping. Delivery is offered in 
just a few stores in Helsinki and the rest of the stores listed offer a pick-up service for 
4,90 € / pick-up. Kesko’s online service is not widely used and is mostly in its testing 
phases. (Kesko 2017) The S Group has launched its online grocery shopping service in 
limited number of cities and with more limited delivery services focused in bigger cities. 
The price for the collection of the products only is 5,90 € if the customer is a member and 
8,90 € if not. Adding delivery costs the total goes up to 16,90-19,90 € / delivery. The 
services are not widely advertised. (SOK 2017) Currently as of November 2017, there are 
a handful of third party services that provide a similar service but have a narrower and 
changing selection of groceries at discounted prices. 
 
To get the customers to move traditional grocery shopping to online, something of value 
must be added that might not be feasible to achieve in a traditional store. If a moderately 
priced delivery is an option, the time saved by the customer could be enough to switch 
from spending time after work in a grocery store, to ordering the food online with just a 
few clicks. More research on how much more the groceries could cost more compared to 
the traditional on the shelf model needs to be done. E-commerce is widely considered as 
a cheaper option because of increased competition, because it directly affects the opera-
tional costs of a traditional service. (Turban et al. 1999) However, in Finland only the 
collection of the products to be ready for the customer to pick them up is reasonably 
priced. The grocery prices are the same as in the store and the collection price varies from 
4,90 € - 6,90 € per pick-up and goes up to almost 20 € if delivery is added. 
 
The biggest benefit for the customer from online shopping is convenience. Unlike shop-
ping for clothes, customers do not go “window shopping” for groceries. (Broniarczyk et 
al. 1998) state that shopping for groceries is perceived as a chore with low involvement 
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and greatly disliked by consumers. To increase their efficiency, customers usually prefer 
only few stores where they know the layout. Online shopping therefore offers a quicker 
and a more convenient way to get grocery shopping done. It is only the matter of price 
but the market is there.  
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5 SUMMARY 
 
Finland as a target of expansion offers a highly developed country with high buying 
power. However, it also has a high cost of labour and high expectations of quality of the 
products consumed. The Finnish grocery store market is very hard to penetrate, but should 
a new entrant try to expand to Finland, learning about the culture and choosing a correct 
market entry mode is crucial. A lot can be learned from how Lidl managed to enter. The 
most important aspect of a successful entering seemed to be the price but the importance 
of domestic products and quality should not be compromised.  
 
Geographical pricing in Finland is important and many foreign giants like Tesco already 
have a multiple-store system in place Extra, Express, Metro etc. all of which have pricing 
adjusted according to the area of operation. This closely mimics the two giants in Finland. 
The different store sizes would allow an entrant to keep the stores separate from each 
other in customers’ minds giving more freedom with the pricing. It has been stated that 
pricing boosted Lidl’s entry to the market so to truly challenge the competition, the en-
trant would need to beat the current prices. The price knowledge and shopping habits of 
the Finnish consumers would need to be closely studied and price the products accord-
ingly. This is something Lidl could have done better and not to give any tools for the local 
competition to attack. Finnish consumers tend to be picky on certain products being Finn-
ish, like milk, and might even choose to shop elsewhere only because the store does not 
offer domestic products. They also follow the food basket closely, which for an entrant 
might create an opportunity to a more cost-effective pricing strategy. A price war would 
be avoided as long as possible, but the current competitors have proven to be ready to 
lower their prices in order to retain their market share. 
 
Tesco made a deal with the S Group to bring their products to Finnish stores, and it is yet 
to be seen, if the company is only testing the reception of their products and plans to fully 
expand to Finland, or is it just a strategy to more widely spread their own products. A 
similar tactic could be used by a new entrant to learn more about the competition and the 
target market. Online retailing is not yet common in Finland, but as the country is tech-
nologically advanced, it might allow a good platform for online grocery stores. In online 
retailing, the population density should be considered for logistical reasons.  
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